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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) applications typically collect and analyse personal data
that can be used to derive sensitive information about individuals. However,
thus far, privacy concerns have not been explicitly considered in software en-
gineering processes when designing IoT applications. The advent of behaviour
driven security mechanisms, failing to address privacy concerns in the design of
IoT applications can have security implications. In this paper, we explore how
a Privacy-by-Design (PbD) framework, formulated as a set of guidelines, can
help software engineers integrate data privacy considerations into the design of
IoT applications. We studied the utility of this PbD framework by studying
how software engineers use it to design IoT applications. We also explore the
challenges in using the set of guidelines to influence the IoT applications design
process. In addition to highlighting the benefits of having a PbD framework to
make privacy features explicit during the design of IoT applications, our studies
also surfaced a number of challenges associated with the approach. A key find-
ing of our research is that the PbD framework significantly increases both novice
and expert software engineers’ ability to design privacy into IoT applications.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Software Engineering, Privacy by Design
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) [28] is a interconnected collection of physical
objects or ‘things’ that have computing, sensing and actuation capabilities, to-
gether with the ability to communicate with each other and other systems to
collect and exchange data. The design and development process for IoT appli-
cations is more complicated than that for desktop, mobile, or web applications
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for a number of reasons. First, IoT applications require both software and hard-
ware (e.g., sensors and actuators) to work together across many different types
of nodes (e.g., micro- controllers, system-on-chips, mobile phones, miniaturized
single-board computers, cloud platforms) with different capabilities under dif-
ferent conditions [26]. Secondly, IoT applications development requires different
types of software engineers to work together (e.g., embedded, mobile, web, desk-
top). The complexity of different software engineering specialists collaborating
to combine different types of hardware and software is compounded by the lack
of integrated development stacks that support the engineering of end-to-end IoT
applications.
Typically, IoT applications collect and analyse personal data that can be
used to derive sensitive information about individuals. While the misuse of this
information can have negative consequences for the individuals concerned, it
can also lead to security problems, particularly with advent of new behaviour
driven security mechanisms. For example, implicit authentication techniques
[33] will grant access to systems based on individual behaviour data collected
by IoT systems. This intertwining of security and privacy issues, means that
privacy needs to be considered as a key requirement for IoT applications. How-
ever, thus far, privacy concerns have not been explicitly considered (despite
isolated solutions [42, 41]) in software engineering processes when designing and
developing IoT applications. This is in part due to a lack of Privacy-by-Design
(PbD) methods for the IoT. Further, the engineering complexities explained
above have forced software engineers to put most of their efforts towards ad-
dressing other challenges such as interoperability and modifiability, resulting in
privacy concerns being largely overlooked. Additionally, a lack of knowledge
about the tangible and intangible benefits of privacy practices have contributed
to privacy challenges being overlooked [35].
We propose to address this issue by providing systematic guidance to help
software engineers develop privacy-aware IoT applications. We build on earlier
work [27] which derived a set of privacy guidelines by examining Hoepman’s [13]
eight design strategies and used them to assess the privacy capabilities of IoT
applications and platforms. This paper integrates these guidelines into a PbD
framework that includes a method for applying the guidelines during the IoT
application design process. We go on to evaluate how this PbD framework can
help software engineers design a number of example IoT applications.
1.1. Contributions
The primary contributions and the scope of this paper are summarised below:
• We evaluate how a proposed set of privacy guidelines can be used to effec-
tively improve IoT application designs. In support of this, we integrate the
guidelines with a method for applying them to propose a PbD framework
for IoT applications.
• Our method is uniquely designed to address the challenges associated with
IoT systems, such as their heterogeneity and distributed nature. This is a
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significant difference from existing PbD frameworks, which focus on more
general, high-level principles and design strategies (e.g., [13], [35]).
• We gain insights into how our framework could help software engineers
improve their design of privacy aware IoT applications by identifying and
applying privacy protecting features into their designs.
• We also explore strengths and weaknesses of our approach as well as chal-
lenges in manual application design processes in general. We provide in-
sights on how to address these weaknesses.
It is important to note that we do not claim our PbD framework is better
than any previous work, nor do we claim that applying set of privacy guidelines
will eliminate all privacy risks. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the
first PbD frameworks that explicitly targets IoT application design challenges.
Our aim is to maximise software engineers’ ability to be aware of and reduce
privacy risks during the design phase. We further elaborate the aims of our
PbD framework in Section 4.
1.2. Target Audience
We developed our PbD framework as a tool for engineers to help make their
designs better through improved privacy awareness. Therefore, it is important
to note that the framework doesn’t provide any formal guarantees that IoT sys-
tems designed using it will be free of potential privacy problems. However, we
believe software engineers will at least be able to apply some privacy guidelines
to their design, which they would not do otherwise. Mostly, we wanted to guide
individuals and teams who do not have time, or resources to invest in hiring
privacy experts. Completely ignoring privacy issues could cost such small teams
a lot it long run as they grow. Later re-factoring is always costly in any soft-
ware development process. Therefore, our guidelines will help entrepreneurial
teams, IoT hackers, hobbyists, etc. to embed privacy protecting features into
their IoT application designs at the initial stages without consulting privacy
experts. While our guidelines cannot replace privacy experts and consultants
in the software engineering process, they can help software engineers to reduce
the effort and time needed from privacy experts.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses common IoT archi-
tectures and their characteristics. It also briefly introduces the data life cycle
phases and their importance when designing privacy into IoT applications. In
Section 3, we present our motivation through three different use cases. We
have used these use cases to evaluate the effectiveness and identify the chal-
lenges in designing privacy aware IoT applications. We briefly introduce the
PbD framework in Section 4. In Section 5, we explain the research methodol-
ogy and evaluate the effectiveness the PbD framework. We discuss our findings
and lessons learned in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 presents the related work
and compares our PbD framework with existing approaches. In Section 8, we
conclude the paper by discussing future directions for our research.
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2. Internet of Things Software Architecture
In this section we provide an overview of IoT software architectures from
the perspective of how data moves through a typical IoT application. As il-
lustrated in Figure 1, in IoT applications, data moves from sensing devices to
gateway devices to the cloud infrastructure [26]. This is the most common ar-
chitectural pattern used in IoT application development, which is also called the
centralised architecture pattern [30]. However, there are other patterns such as
1) collaborative, 2) connected intranet of Things, and 3) distributed IoT [30].
Even for these other types of architectures, if we consider a single data item, we
can observe a data flow analogous to that of the centralised architecture pat-
tern where data moves from edge devices to the cloud through different types
of nodes. Therefore, while we use the centralised IoT architectural pattern to
explain our PbD framework in this paper, our approach is agnostic the choice
of pattern.
Centralised architectures typically consist of three components: 1) IoT de-
vices, 2) Gateway devices, and 3) IoT cloud platforms (Figure 1), each with
different computational capabilities. They also have different types of access to
energy sources from permanent to solar power to battery power. Each device
may also have limitations as to the type of data processing that can be done
due to lack of availability of essential knowledge. A typical IoT application
would integrate all these different types of devices with different capabilities. It
is important to note that different types of privacy protecting measures can be
taken on each of these components based on their characteristics.
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Figure 1: Typical data flow in IoT Applications
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We define a five-phase data life cycle that provides a systematic way of
thinking about the data flow in an IoT system for the application of our PbD
framework. Within each device (also called a node), data moves through the
data life cycle phases: Consent and Data Acquisition [CDA], Data Preprocess-
ing [DPP], Data Processing and Analysis [DPA], Data Storage [DS] and Data
Dissemination [DD]. The CDA phase comprises routing and data collection ac-
tivities by a given node. DPP describes any type of processing performed on the
raw data to prepare it for another processing procedure. DPA is, broadly, the
collection and manipulation of data items to produce meaningful information.
DD is the distribution or transmission of data to an external party.
All the data life cycle phases are applicable to all nodes in an IoT application,
making it possible for software engineers to put in place appropriate mechanisms
to protect user privacy. However, based on the decisions taken by engineers,
some data life cycle phases in some nodes may not be utilised. For example,
a sensor node may utilise the DPP phase to average temperature data. Then,
without using either the DPA or DS phases to analyse or store data (due to
hardware and energy constraints) the sensor node may push the averaged data
to the gateway node using the DD phase.
3. Example IoT Scenarios
In this section, we present three use case scenarios, which we also use to eval-
uate the PbD framework as described in Section 5. Each scenario is presented
from a problem owner’s perspective, where each problem could be solved by de-
veloping an IoT application. More importantly, it should be noted that none of
these scenarios explicitly highlight privacy requirements or challenges. They are
primarily focused on explaining functional requirements at a high level. Later
in Section 4, we explain how our PbD framework can be used by software en-
gineers to extract additional information from problem owners, that are crucial
to design privacy aware IoT applications.
3.1. Use case 1: Rehabilitation and Recovery
Summary: Robert is a researcher who oversees a number of rehabilitation
facilities around the country where patients with physical disabilities are treated
and rehabilitated. Robert is interested in collecting and analysing data from
sensors worn by patients while they engage in certain activities (e.g., walk using
walker, walk using crutches, climb stairs), in order to guide the patients’ recovery
processes in a more personalised manner. Robert has an application that is
capable of analysing patient data and developing personalised rehabilitation
plans. The application monitors the progress and alters the rehabilitation plans
accordingly. There is a speciality nurse allocated for each patient in order to
monitor the recovery progress and provide necessary advice when required.
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3.2. Use case 2: Health and Well-being
Summary: Michael works in local government for the department of pub-
lic health and well-being. He has been asked to develop a plan to improve the
public health in his city by improving the infrastructure that supports exercise
and recreational activities (e.g., parks and the paths that supports jogging, cy-
cling, and places for bar exercise, etc.). In order to develop an efficient and
effective plan, Michael needs to understand the movements of people and sev-
eral other aspects of their activities. Michael is planning to recruit volunteers
in order to gather data using sensors. Michael has an application that is ca-
pable of analysing different types of data and recommending possible lifestyle
improvements for healthier living. Michael only needs to collect data when the
volunteers are within the park premises.
3.3. Use case 3: Amusement Park and Leisure
Summary: TrueLeisure is a company that operates different types of fran-
chised entertainment attractions. Their amusement parks are located in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. These amusement parks are
fully owned and operated by franchisees. However, TrueLeisure continuously
monitors and assesses service quality attributes and several other aspects at
each of the amusement parks. Jane is a data analyst overseeing the quality
assessment tasks at TrueLeisure. She is responsible for continuously monitoring
the service quality attributes. Waiting time is one of the key service quality
attributes and is a key determinant of customer satisfaction. Local quality as-
sessment teams continuously measure visitors’ waiting time for each ride and
attraction within their own amusement park. All visitors use TrueLeisure’s
theme park mobile app to buy tickets for attractions, further information, tour
guide, maps, etc. Jane is interested in the big picture, i.e. she would like to mea-
sure the overall waiting time for each ride attraction by combining individual
waiting times. Jane will report these measurements to TrueLeisure management
to guide franchisees on future developments of their theme parks efficiently and
effectively.
4. Privacy-by-Design Framework
In each of the example scenarios above, a software engineer would need
to perform further analysis to extract explicit privacy requirements that could
support the design of privacy enhancing features into the IoT applications that
would be developed to deliver the required functionality. In this section we
provide an overview of our PbD framework [27] and explain how it could be
used to design privacy into IoT applications. We also explain why guidelines
are useful to software engineers.
4.1. Why Guidelines (or Heuristics or Check-lists)?
We use the term guidelines as our intention is to guide software engineers.
In general, a guideline aims to improve or maintain efficiency of a particular
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process based on a set of best practices. Guidelines may not be mandatory
to follow, but provide recommendations based on experience of dealing with
particular problems. Therefore, the term heuristics is also an appropriate term
for our guidelines. These techniques rely on using readily accessible, though
loosely applicable, information to control problem solving in human beings,
machines, and abstract issues [24]. Heuristics do not promise to produce perfect
or optimal solutions. Finally, the term check-list is also appropriate to identify
our guidelines. A check-list is a type of informational aid used to reduce failure
by compensating for potential limits of human memory and attention. Our
guidelines also aim to reduce human errors by reducing knowledge requirements.
Sometimes, guidelines are considered to be a less useful approach due to
their inherent characteristics such as: lack of proof (for consistency or correct-
ness), dependence on the subjective judgement of the follower, lack of rigorous
scientific methods for extracting guidelines, and so on. Despite such weaknesses,
guidelines are being used successfully in many domains. The following exam-
ples showcase where guidelines / heuristics / check-lists are successfully used to
address different challenges.
• Heuristics based usability design and evaluation is widely used in the hu-
man computer interaction domain [22, 21].
• The Information commissioner’s office, UK’s independent authority set up
to uphold information rights in the public interest, use check-lists to guide
businesses to prepare themselves for GDPR 1.
• Surgical Safety Check-list developed for the World Health Organization
by Dr. Atul Gawande has been able to reduce mortality by 23% and
all complications by 40% [12]. Airplane pilots rely upon check-lists to
ensure that both routine procedures and emergency responses are handled
appropriately [11].
The above usages and successes have given us confidence to integrate guide-
lines into our PbD framework. The framework combines the guidelines with a
method for applying them that avoids the need for individual software engineers
to spend time thinking about relevant privacy considerations for their IoT ap-
plications themselves. Instead, they can save time and effort by systematically
working through the guidelines one by one and checking whether they can apply
them. Our node-by-node design methodology also helps manage the complexity
of IoT application designs. Guidelines also provide meaningful ways to divide
workload among engineers (e.g., each engineer may focus / specialise on address-
ing a few guidelines) and can be used as a common knowledge base to discuss
application designs in teams. Guidelines make the design process comparatively
less tiring for engineers as it reduces intensive thinking and knowledge require-
ments. Guidelines also allow engineers to pause and resume conveniently and
1https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection-2-4.pdf
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keep track of design changes. We acknowledge that guidelines are not perfect
and will need to be reviewed and refined over time. However, evidence suggests
that guidelines can help to improve effectiveness and efficiency in a range of sit-
uations, and in this paper we demonstrate this in the context of privacy aware
IoT application design.
4.2. Overview of the Guidelines
For ease of reference, we present an overview of our privacy guidelines in Ta-
ble 1. These guidelines are based on Hoepman’s [13] privacy strategies, which
we determined to be the most appropriate starting point for developing a more
detailed set of PbD guidelines for IoT applications. The guidelines were com-
piled by using the structured-case research method [3], which is often used for
building theory in information systems research. A more detailed explanation
on each of the guidelines and reasoning behind the extraction of each guideline
is presented in [27].
The guidelines allow software engineers to customise them as needed to suit
their IoT applications. For example, certain applications will require aggre-
gation of data from different sources to discover particular new knowledge (i.e.
new pieces of information). Such approaches are not discouraged as long as data
is acquired through proper consent acquisition processes. However, IoT appli-
cations, at all times, should take all possible measures to achieve their goals
with a minimum amount of data. This means that out of the eight privacy de-
sign strategies proposed by Hoepman [13], minimisation is the most important
strategy.
In our previous work [27], we identified two major privacy risks, namely,
secondary usage and unauthorised access that would arise as consequences of
not following the guidelines. Secondary usage refers to the use of collected data
for purposes that were not initially consented to by the data owners [18], which
can lead to privacy violations. Unauthorised access is when someone breaches
the confidentiality of the data during any phase of the data life cycle by gaining
access without proper authorisation. The privacy risks of secondary usage and
unauthorised access are denoted using the symbols (⊗) and () respectively to
indicate their relevance to each guideline. In Table 1, privacy guidelines are
colour coded based on the primary privacy design strategy that they belong to.
However, it is important to note that some guidelines may belong to multiple
design strategies. For example, (Guidelines 6) minimise data retention period
can primarily be identified as a minimise strategy, but it can also be classified
as a hide strategy as it reduces the period for which data is visible.
4.3. Use of Privacy-by-Design Framework
The objective of the proposed PbD framework is to help software engineers
to ask the right questions regarding privacy protection when designing IoT ap-
plications and their architectures. Our approach integrates privacy guidelines
into a framework that includes a method for engineers to start thinking about
privacy and incorporate privacy features into IoT application designs. A piece
8
Table 1: Privacy-by-Design Framework
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of software is designed to solve a problem. Sometimes, a problem may be iden-
tified by a person who is affected by the problem (e.g., Robert, Michael or Jane
in our motivating scenarios). At other times, a third party company may iden-
tify a generic problem that affects many other people (e.g., Enterprise resource
planning solutions). This type of software engineering is common in the IoT
domain as well. Some IoT solutions are generic middleware platforms that can
be used to build end to end applications. Others are complete IoT applications
that aim to solve a specific problem [26, 25].
However, problem owners mainly focus on the requirements that would help
to solve their problem [1], ignoring privacy considerations. Therefore, privacy
requirements are largely overlooked when designing software architectures for
IoT applications. The PbD framework allows both problem owners and soft-
ware engineers to sit together and discuss the problem and incorporate privacy
protecting measures into IoT application designs.
In section 3, we presented three use case scenarios. For each scenario, we have
a problem owner’s expectation and a brief set of requirements. There is no ex-
plicit reference to privacy protecting measures. We assume, additional informa-
tion can only be gathered through questioning the problem owners and domain
experts. In the studies reported later in this paper, we simulated such discus-
sions between the problem owners (represented by ourselves, the researchers)
and the software engineers (represented by the study participants). Our hy-
pothesis was that the PbD framework will help software engineers ask questions
from both problem owners and domain experts in order to extract detailed re-
quirements that could be used to design privacy features into IoT applications.
To illustrate how this might work in practice, let us revisit the scenario pre-
sented in section 3.1 and use our PbD framework to extract privacy requirements
for designing a privacy-aware IoT application.
Guideline 1 leads software engineers to ask the question: what types and
quantities of data are required to achieve the Robert’s objective? In our scenario
the problem owner responds as follows:
Robert collects data using wearable sensor kits. The collected data types are
pulse, oxygen in blood (SPO2), airflow (breathing), body temperature, electro-
cardiogram (ECG), glucometer, galvanic skin response (GSR-sweating), blood
pressure (sphygmomanometer), patient activity (accelerometer) and muscle /
eletromyography sensor (EMG). The accelerometer data is used to derive patient
activity. In addition to the sensor data, weather information such as temper-
ature, humidity are also important for the Robert’s research. Patients’ mobile
phones GPS sensors and weather APIs are used to collect such information.
The data collection sampling rate is expected to be 30 seconds. Data is only
required to be collected when patients are performing either one of the monitored
activities (i.e. walking with walker or crutches, or climbing stairs).
Based on this information the software engineer can decide not to acquire
any other types of data and also design appropriate sampling rate controls into
the application. This will have the effect of minimising data acquisition and
reducing the risk of both secondary usage and unauthorised access to private
data.
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In a similar fashion, guidelines 3, 5, 20 and 21 would lead a software engineer
to ask questions such as: what type of data is required in raw formats and what
type of information can be aggregated in order to reduce privacy risks?. As a
result, the following information may be gathered.
Robert requires oxygen in blood (SPO2), airflow (breathing), body tempera-
ture data types in raw formats which need to be accurate. The data collection
sampling rate is expected to be five seconds. In contrast, other data items can
be aggregated into averaged values (e.g., aggregated over two minutes).
Similar guidelines based questioning can be used to extract privacy require-
ments which the software engineers can use to systematically design privacy into
the IoT application. Due to space limitations, we don’t detail all the questions
that could be asked in relation to the scenario. Instead, below we provide the
information that could be acquired using our PbD approach by annotating a de-
tailed description of the scenario with references to the relevant PbD guidelines
at the end of each statement.
The sensor kit is expected to push data to the patient’s mobile phone us-
ing Bluetooth. The mobile phone pushes data to the rehabilitation centre’s local
server using Wi-Fi. The local server pushes data to the cloud IoT platform.
Patients come to the rehabilitation centre 3 days a week in order to perform
the tasks assigned to them. Over a further 3 days they perform the tasks in
their homes. The smart phone is expected to push data to the local server at the
end of each day (Guideline 6). However, if the patients perform their tasks
at home, data need to be stored on the mobile until they next visit the rehabil-
itation centre (Guideline 6). The speciality nurses monitor the progress and
advise the patients on weekly basis. The speciality nurses’ responsibility is to
make sure that the patients are performing the tasks as assigned by the recom-
mendation system and assists patients if they have any difficulties in following
the assigned tasks and schedules. Robert is required to analyse data every six
months in order to understand the how to improve the rehabilitation processes in
a personalized manner (Guideline 6). For long term data analysis purposes,
Robert’s application stores data after averaging over five minutes (Guideline
6).
Robert’s application requires averages over five minutes when patients are
performing their tasks (Guideline 20). Patient data can be anonymized (Guide-
line 8). Data storage in both mobile device, local server and Robert’s cloud
server should store data in encrypted form (Guideline 11). End-to-end en-
cryption can be used to secure the data communication (Guideline 9). Robert
does not require the exact locations where patients may have performed the activ-
ities. The requirement is to acquire the weather parameters such as temperature,
humidity, etc. Therefore, location data can be abstracted without affecting the
accuracy of the data (Guideline 12). In this IoT application, data processing
and storage happens in three different nodes, namely, 1) patient phone, 2) local
server, and 3) Robert’s cloud server (Guideline 15 and 16).
The above example illustrates how the PbD guidelines could be used to
extract additional information regarding a use case which enables software en-
gineers to design appropriate privacy enhancing features into their IoT applica-
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Table 2: Relevant Privacy Requirements for Each Use Case Scenario
Guideline (↓) Use Case Number (→) 1 2 3
1-Minimise data acquisition X X X
2-Minimise number of data sources – X –
3-Minimise raw data intake X X X
5-Minimise data storage X X X
6-Minimise data retention period X X X
7-Hidden data routing X X X
8-Data anonymisation X X X
9-Encrypted data communication X X X
11-Encrypted data storage X X X
12-Reduce data granularity X X X
15-Distributed data processing X X X
16-Distributed data storage X X X
18-Geography based aggregation – – X
20-Time-Period based aggregation X X X
21-Category based aggregation X X X
13 14 14
tions. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our PbD framework, we devel-
oped similar detailed requirement descriptions for each of the use case scenarios,
which we have omitted here due to space limitations. It is important to note
that not all privacy guidelines are relevant to all IoT applications. In Table 2,
we summarise which privacy guidelines are relevant to each scenario.
5. Evaluation
This section explains how we evaluated our PbD framework, together with
our research methodology. Specifically, our evaluation is based on the following
two studies:
1. Study 1 (Primary): [Interview based] This was our primary study in
which we tested our main hypothesis: ‘Can the proposed PbD framework
guide software engineers with varied levels of experience to design IoT
applications that are more privacy-aware than they would do otherwise?’
Additionally, we explored engineers’ perception of each guideline, their
usefulness, and applicability in different IoT use case scenarios - collec-
tively referring to this as the engineers’ privacy mindset. The study was
administered by a researcher and focused on both quantitative (for hy-
pothesis testing) and qualitative data.
2. Study 2 (Secondary): [Online activity based] This was a self admin-
istered online study. In this study, we explored the engineers’ privacy
mindset with respect to each guideline. In contrast to Study 1, here we
used an anonymous, informal, and relaxed methodology using a self ad-
ministered online activity that could be completed over a 3-day period. We
12
used this study to strengthen our findings from Study 1 as well as to reach
theoretical saturation2. In this study, we mainly focused on qualitative
data (though we present some quantitative aspects).
For each study, we first explain the aims of the study followed by a de-
scription of the participant recruitment strategy and sample size. Finally we
describe the procedures followed at each step of the study. In adopting this
approach, we were partially inspired by the evaluation strategies used by com-
parable techniques, particularly the evaluation methodology used for LINDDUN
[7], including adopting a use case based evaluation technique.
5.1. Study 1 (Primary) - Interview-based
5.1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore how our PbD framework can help soft-
ware engineers to design privacy-aware IoT applications. Through user studies,
using quantitative and qualitative data analysis, we aimed to answer following
three questions that explore the effectiveness of the proposed PbD framework.
We discuss these questions later in this section.
• Can the proposed PbD framework guide less experienced (novice) software
engineers to design IoT applications that are more privacy-aware than the
applications they would design without the guidelines?
• Can the proposed PbD framework guide more experienced (expert) soft-
ware engineers to design IoT applications that are more privacy-aware
than the applications they would design without the guidelines?
• Out of novice and expert software engineers, who would benefit most
from the proposed PbD framework? or in other words, does the level
of software engineering expertise matter when it comes to incorporating
privacy protection features into IoT application designs?
In the first two questions above, we consider the design of an IoT appli-
cation to be more privacy-aware if the designer considers a greater number of
privacy concerns to incorporate appropriate privacy protecting features. We
measure this in terms of the number of privacy guidelines considered by the
study participants when designing the example IoT applications.
5.1.2. Recruitment and Remuneration
In total, we recruited 10 participants for the study of which five were novice
software engineers and five were expert software engineers. A participant was
classified as a novice if they had less than three years of experience (full-time)
in a software engineering role (design or development). Participants with more
2Theoretical saturation is the phase of qualitative data analysis in which the researcher
has continued sampling and analysing data until no (or very minimal) new data appear [17]
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than three years of experience (design or development), were considered to be
experts. We adopted an opportunistic sampling technique and participants were
recruited from the staff and student populations across two universities in the
United Kingdom. No criteria other than software engineering experience was
considered when recruiting participants. We collected demographic informa-
tion such as age, highest education qualification, and the number of years in
a software engineering role. Each participant was compensated with shopping
vouchers valued at GBP 20. There were no failure criteria as long as the par-
ticipant attend the data collection session of the study. The study design was
reviewed and approved by our institution’s Human Research Ethics Committee.
Table 3 summarises the demographic information about the participants. We
have labelled them E1-E5 (Expert) and N1-N5 (Novice) and consider them to
be independent cases for the purposes of our qualitative analysis process.
5.1.3. Procedure
All the data collection sessions were carried out as 1-to-1 lab-based observa-
tional studies. The principal investigator (PI) acted as the facilitator as well as
the observer during each of the sessions. The duration of each session was 1.5
hours. At the beginning of the each session, participants were given the consent
form to sign off and brief demographic information was collected. We audio
recorded all the discussions between the participants and the PI for qualitative
analysis purposes. Next, participants were given an instruction sheet, as shown
in Figure 2, that comprised a set of example notations that could be used to
illustrate the design of the IoT applications. Participants were reassured that
adherence to the notation was not essential.
We divided the rest of the study into three rounds, first with no guidance
to consider privacy or reference to the PbD framework (Round 1), then with a
prompt to consider privacy requirements for the use cases but no reference to
the PbD framework (Round 2), and finally using the PbD framework (Round
Table 3: Demographics of Study 1 (Primary Study)
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E1 (Male) 20-29 MSc 4 (Expert) Desktop, Mobile, Web
E2 (Female) 30-39 PG(Diploma) 8 (Expert) Mobile, web, system integration
E3 (Female) 30-39 MSc 8 (Expert) Embedded, Textile Design, wearable
E4 (Male) 40-49 BSc 10 (Expert) Data Science
E5 (Male) 20-29 BSc 6.5 (Expert) Desktop, Mobile, Web
N1 (Male) 30-39 PhD 3 (Novice) Signal Processing
N2 (Male) 30-39 MSc 2.5 (Novice) Desktop
N3 (Male) 20-29 BSc 3 (Novice) Desktop
N4 (Male) 30-39 MSc 1 (Novice) Desktop
N5 (Male) 30-39 MSc 3 (Novice) Web
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3). However, this segmentation was only used to structure the discussions and
observations and none of the rounds were formally acknowledged or identified
during the sessions.
Round 1 (NoPrivacy) - IoT application design without any guidance to
consider privacy or reference to the PbD guidelines: It is important to note that
we informed the participants that this is an IoT application design study, with-
out making any reference to privacy. This was done with the expectation that
participants would be unbiased and follow their natural process for designing an
IoT application. We gave them separate A4 sheets to draw their IoT application
designs with respect to each use case. They were briefed about the notations
they could use, but we did not restrict them to any particular notation as long
as their designs were understandable and clearly annotated.
The participants were asked to design IoT applications to satisfy the require-
ments of each the scenarios presented in Section 3. Initially the participants
worked from the summary descriptions provided in this paper but the PI was
prepared to provide more detailed information, similar to that presented in Sec-
tion 4.3 if the participant explicitly asked any related questions. We designed
the study to simulate a conversation between a software engineer and a problem
DataTypes (Input) Data Processing 
Component
Gateway
Cloud
Use the following notation to draw your design
Sensor Kit (Multiple Sensors connected to single board)
DataTypes (Output)
Gateway Devices (Example: Raspberry Pi / Smart Phone)
DataTypes 
(Input)
Data 
Processing 
Component
DataTypes 
(Output)
Cloud Service (Example: Microsoft Azure, IBM Bluemix, Amazon Web Services)
DataTypes 
(Input)
Data 
Processing 
Component
DataTypes 
(Output)
Data Flow
DataTypes + 
Other Info 
Please feel free to 
write down any  
information that is 
helpful for an 
engineer to build 
the system
Figure 2: Notations to be used in IoT application Design
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owner, where the engineer is trying to elaborate the requirements and design
the architecture of the IoT application.
We encouraged participants to ask as many question as possible about the
case studies and application requirements. This means that participants could
have asked any question regarding privacy requirements if they wanted to. Some
of the commonly asked questions are discussed later in this paper. We gave
them 50 minutes to complete the IoT application designs for the three use cases
provided. However, the time limit was only a guide to the participants and
was not enforced. The actual time taken for each study varied based on the
time taken by the participants on each phase. So the actual total time varied
between 1 hour and 15 minutes to 2 hours. We always allowed each participant
to naturally progress through their designs without rushing them through each
phase. After the designs were completed, we asked the participants to explain
their designs and briefly justify their design decisions.
Round 2 (WithPrivacy)- IoT application design with guidance to con-
sider privacy but without privacy guidelines:Next, we gave participants a ten
minute introduction on privacy. In order to achieve consistency, accuracy,
and a well recognised description of privacy and related challenges, we selected
two videos3 4 from YouTube produced and published by Privacy International
(www.privacyinternational.org). The objective of showing these videos to each
participant was to provoke them to think about privacy and help them to recall
their past experiences and knowledge of dealing with privacy issues. This was
intended to help them with the next task. It is important to note that we did
not provide any additional material on privacy at this stage.
Next, we asked the participants to refine their previous IoT application de-
signs further to protect user privacy. Similar to the previous round, questions
were welcomed. We gave the participants 20 minutes to refine the IoT appli-
cation designs for the three use cases provided. For Round 2, they wrote in
a different colour to Round 1, which enabled us to distinguish the design ac-
tivities from each round clearly. After the revisions were made, we asked the
participants to explain their revised designs and how they improved privacy
protection.
Round 3 (WithPbDGuidelines) - IoT applications design with privacy
guidelines: Finally, we gave participants an introduction to the PbD guide-
lines and how to use them. We asked the participants to refine their previous
IoT application designs to protect user privacy. Similar to the previous round,
questions were welcomed. We gave the participants 20 minutes to enhance the
privacy features of their IoT application designs for the three use cases pro-
vided. After the revisions were made, we asked the participants to explain their
revised designs and how they improve privacy protection. Once completed, we
collected the IoT application designs produced by the participant. Some sample
application designs produced by participants are presented in Figure 3.
3What Is Privacy? (youtube.com/watch?v=zsboDBMq6vo)
4Big Data (youtube.com/watch?v=HOoKhnvoYkU)
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5.2. Study 2 (Secondary) - Online Activity-based
5.2.1. Purpose
Study 1 was conducted by a researcher using an interview-based approach.
Therefore, participants may have been compelled to think and perform harder
during the study. On the other hand, at times we failed to convince the engi-
neers to apply certain guidelines into a given IoT application scenario. In real
world situations, these PbD guidelines would need to be used by engineers with-
out supervision (or assistance). By taking these factors into consideration, we
designed a second study aimed at exploring the engineers’ mindset towards the
PbD guidelines. More specifically, we explored what software engineers think
about each guideline, their reasoning and decision making process when apply-
ing them. It is important to note that the data gathered in Study 2 addresses
the same question as Study 1 (Round 3), albeit in a different context. We used
Study 2 to strengthen the findings of Study 1 as well as to reach theoretical
saturation [17] and we will compare these results in Section 6.
5.2.2. Recruitment
In total, we recruited 17 participants, one of whom dropped out, giving us a
final set of 16 participants. This survey, which was conducted at a French Uni-
versity with participants who were Masters students and were recruited using a
convenience sampling approach. No compensation was given to the participants.
The study involved completing 32 IoT use case scenarios. Based on the lessons
we learned from Study 1, we did not consider the level of experience to be a
relevant factor in this study. The demographic summary for the participants is
presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Demographics of Study 2 (Secondary Study)
5.2.3. Procedure
This study was organised using two online surveys. Each participant was
given three days to complete the activity. As in Study 1, we used the three
case studies presented in Section 3. We formulated the each survey into two
logical rounds (in contrast, to the three rounds in Study 1), 1) without privacy
guidelines, and 2) with privacy guidelines:
Round 1: A use case scenario is presented to each participant. Then, we
asked the question “What kind of privacy protecting measures might you incor-
porate into the IoT application design?”. We also recommended the participants
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to sketch a data flow diagram saying “Even though it is not required, it might be
useful for you to sketch a data flow diagram to understand how you might want
design the IoT application”.
Round 2: In this round, we presented different PbD guidelines, one by
one, and asked the participants to answer appropriately. ( “Please read the
above privacy guideline. Do you think this guideline can be applied to the IoT
application design? If ’Yes’; please briefly explain how you might apply this
guideline. If ’No’: Please explain why this guideline cannot be applied”).
6. Findings, Discussion and Lessons Learned
In this work, we followed the multi-method - multi-strand method [37]. More
specifically, we used two data collection methods (i.e., interviews and online
activities) and collected multiple types of data (i.e., IoT application designs
[drawings]), participants views [audio], participants ability to identify privacy
preserving measures [numeric]). In this section, we first analyse and discuss
the results quantitatively. Our aim is to address the three questions presented
earlier in Section 5.1 with the help of data collected through Study 1. Later, we
discuss the results of both Study 1 and 2 qualitatively in order to understand
software engineers’ approach towards designing privacy-aware IoT applications.
6.1. Quantitative Analysis (Exploring Effectiveness)
As shown in Table 2, in Study 1 we expected each participant to identify
a maximum of 41 privacy protecting measures (Use-case 1: 12 measures, Use-
case 2: 14 measures, Use-case 3: 14 measures). The participants may identify
these privacy measures either using their experience, common sense, or using
the PbD guidelines. In total, we collected 410 data points (41 measures x 10
participants). We present an overview of the data gathered using two heat-
maps in Figure 5 where the results for novice and expert software engineers are
presented separately.
The heat-maps clearly show that both novice and expert software engineers
were able to identify a greater number of privacy protecting measures by using
the PbD guidelines than they would do otherwise. In Figure 6, we illustrate
how the mean of the ‘number of privacy measures’ identified changes at different
privacy knowledge levels, for novice and experts software engineers. The average
number of privacy measures identified, in Round 1, by novices is 0.2 and experts
is 2.2. Similarly, the average number of privacy measures identified, in Round
2, by novices is 6.6 and experts is 6.8. Further, the average number of privacy
measures identified, in Round 3, by novices is 32.6 and experts is 30.4.
Next, we ran statistical tests (i.e., ANOVA5) and found out that there
is a significant difference between the number of privacy measures identified
with and without the PbD guidelines (within=PrivacyKnowledge (ANOVA p =
5statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/one-way-anova-statistical-guide.php
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Figure 5: The three use-cases are marked using three separate colours. The x-axis denotes
how many privacy protecting measures have been identified in each round (the darkness of the
sharing is proportional to the number of privacy requirements identified). The y-axis denotes
the participant ID.
Figure 6: Number of privacy measures identified in each round
2.099781e-09; p < 0.05)). Further, our results show that the expertise of the soft-
ware engineers (novice vs. expert) has no significant effect on the identification
of privacy protecting measures (between=Expertise (ANOVA p = 6.897806e-01;
p < 0.05)) .
Figure 7 illustrates which privacy guidelines have been identified in each
round by the participants. It is important to note that PbD guideline 2 and 18
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were only relevant in one of the use case scenarios which explains its unusually
low identification rate in Figure 8. To avoid any confusion, we have presented
the x-axis of the Figure 8 as a percentage. Comparatively, more participants
have identified PbD Guideline 3 (Minimise raw data intake) and 20 (Time pe-
riod based aggregation) in Round 1. However, our discussions revealed that
participants integrated these features into their designs to meet functional re-
quirements of the scenarios rather than due to a consideration of privacy. In
Round 2, after we explicitly asked them to improve the privacy awareness of
their IoT application designs, participants primarily identified Guideline 8 (data
anonymisation), Guideline 9 (encrypted data communication), and Guideline 11
(encrypted data storage). In Round 3, there was no noticeable difference in the
guidelines identified by the participants.
Results from both Study 1 (Figure 7) and Study 2 (Figure 8) are compara-
ble, showing that participants mostly understand and agree with the usage of
encryption (communication and storage) and data minimisation very well. How-
ever, we observe a higher refusal / disagreement rate in Study 2. We discuss
this phenomenon further in Section 6.2.
In total, we expected participants to identify a maximum of 410 privacy pre-
serving measures that they could take in order to improve the privacy awareness
of the three given IoT application scenarios. They identified 308 privacy pre-
serving measures with the help of the PbD guidelines, giving a success rate of
75.12%. As shown in Figure 6, this result is significantly better than ‘without
PbD guidelines’. Based on our discussions with the participants, we identified
two main reasons why they sometimes failed to apply a given guideline to their
designs: 1) the IoT application designs eliminates the need to apply certain
privacy preserving measures; and 2) the lack of time. The former reason arises
because PbD guidelines can only be applied in certain application design con-
Figure 7: Study 1 - Privacy guidelines identified in each round: the x-axis denotes privacy
guidelines by number and each colour represents the three rounds. The y-axis denotes the
frequency with which participants identified a given privacy guideline. Legend for both Figure
7 and Figure 8: 1-Minimise data acquisition, 2-Minimise number of data sources, 3-Minimise
raw data intake, 5-Minimise data storage, 6-Minimise data retention period, 7-Hidden data
routing, 8-Data anonymisation, 9-Encrypted data communication, 11-Encrypted data stor-
age, 12-Reduce data granularity, 15-Distributed data processing, 16-Distributed data storage,
18-Geography based aggregation, 20-Time-Period based aggregation, 21-Category based ag-
gregation.
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Figure 8: Study 2 - Participants’ view on whether a given guideline can be applied or not to
the given IoT use case scenario. Legend: Yes = participant agrees that a given guideline can
be applied; No = participant refuses to apply a given guideline; N/A = participant did not
clearly specify whether the guideline is applicable or not.
texts. Some participants designed their IoT applications such that certain PbD
guidelines were not relevant. We discuss one such example in the next section.
6.2. Qualitative Analysis and Lessons Learned
We followed Miles framework [20] to conduct the qualitative analysis. Fur-
ther, for data reduction phase, we use Richards three tier coding technique (i.e.,
descriptive coding, topic coding, and analytic coding) [29]. This yielded three
broad themes relating to, (1) methodological lessons for the PbD framework
for IoT, (2) lessons about the cognitive behaviour of engineers when designing
privacy into IoT applications, and (3) practical lessons relating to PbD for IoT
applications (4). We provide further details of the lessons learned through the
qualitative analysis below.
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Table 4: Qualitative analysis: Themes and lessons
Themes Lessons
Methodological Ambiguity in use case description;
Duration of the tasks; Task authenticity
Cognitive Privacy mindset; Exploratory cues; Knowledge gaps;
Adoption barriers; Guideline descriptions; Supporting consistency;
Unconscious bias; Over analysis
Practical Contextual advice; Limitations of informed consent;
Responsible engineering; Alternative technologies;
Building on adequate security
6.2.1. Methodological Lessons
By observing our study participants engagement with the PbD framework,
we identified lessons relating to the method for applying our approach.
First, we intentionally kept the use cases descriptions used in the study brief,
expecting that participants would ask questions to clarify any ambiguities. From
the participants perspective, this provided an authentic experience of discussing
requirements with a stakeholder as part of producing a design. However, none
of these discussions developed into privacy requirements gathering. Instead,
participants questions focussed on functional and technological requirements.
Indeed, only one (out of 10) participants in Study 1 explicitly discussed privacy
requirements during one of the Round 1 designs. For example, when formulating
a design for Use Case 2, participant [E1] said Thinking about issues as privacy,
for example, I would just be interested to know how many are there and not who
is there. By that I could, for example, use the signal of the mobile phone and
identify how many mobile phones are there. This demonstrates the importance
of having PbD frameworks for IoT application design that will prompt engineers
to explore privacy issues due to ambiguity in use case descriptions.
Another methodological lesson stems from the duration of the tasks in-
volved in applying the PbD framework. The total duration of the activity in
Study 1 was about 1.5 hrs. Going through privacy guidelines and deciding when,
whether, or how to apply them is a significant and tiring task, especially when
the number of guidelines is significant. However, if we try to reduce the number
of guidelines, this will increase the abstractness and ambiguity of each guideline
(e.g., Ann Cavoukian [5]). This aspect highlights the need for tools to support
the application of the PbD framework.
Finally, from the methodological perspective we noted the impact of task
authenticity on the participants behaviour. In particular we observed more ex-
amples of engineers reluctance to adopt privacy guidelines in Study 1 (Round 3)
when compared to Study 2 (Round 3). We attribute this to the self-administered,
unsupervised context of Study 2 where participants had independence and flex-
ibility over how that explored and applied the guidelines. We note that these
features made Study 2 a more authentic experience of real-world design contexts
where software engineers have to use PbD guidelines by themselves.
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6.2.2. Cognitive Lessons
The second theme we identified from the qualitative analysis relates to the
behaviour and thought processes of the engineers as the completed the tasks.
A key lesson in this theme is the need for engineers to develop a privacy
mindset. This is a way of thinking that consistently considers privacy as part
of the design process. The absence of a privacy mindset is illustrated by the
example of participant [N1] who recognised the importance of anonymising and
deleting the data with regards to Scenario 1 in Round 2, but was reluctant and
refused to apply the same ideas to Scenario 3. Specifically, they said I mean
I can see a whole bunch of scenarios where they would want to pitch different
kinds of deals to these individuals. Thats why Im saying its very unlikely that
they would adopt any sort of privacy enhancement measure, to get rid of or de-
anonymise that data.’ The absence of a privacy mindset is also illustrated by
participants superficial consideration of privacy. For example, participant [E4]
was not particularly interested in thinking about privacy from certain aspects
such data minimisation saying that So, that information would, in theory, it
might be possible to infer from the raw data, but in practice that could be quite
tricky (Laughter). There were also examples of participants treating privacy as
a secondary objective, focusing on collecting as much data as possible (e.g.,
Participants [E2] said As a developer, you just want all of the data). The PbD
framework presented here supports engineers in developing a privacy mindset.
One way in which the guidelines support engineers was in providing ex-
ploratory cues, prompting them to draw on wider expertise to address privacy
issues. Privacy guidelines can effectively educate and inform intelligent, but non
specialist engineers and designers. For example, participant [E2] mentioned that
The distributed data processing, I had not thought about at all to be honest I do
not think but yes, I think it could definitely apply to all of these in some way. I
am not sure how because I do not work in networks, or do this kind of stuff but
I think that it would be good.’
Another lesson was that knowledge gaps in engineers understanding of
how different technologies can enhance privacy. For example, participant [E1] of
Study 1 mentioned that I guess it is not necessary to encrypt and anonymise the
data.’ They did not understand that encryption and anonymisation techniques
are designed for different purposes, providing two lines of defence. We also
observed adoption barriers, when discussing the application of the guidelines.
For example, in Study 1, participant [N5] refused to apply categories based
aggregation guidelines, saying Yes, I understood, but I dont think that we need
the categories based aggregation.
We also noted the influence of unconscious bias stemming from the prior
expertise of the engineers. For example, in Study 1, participant [N1] implicitly
thought about data minimisation from a networking perspective: Is it sort of
a very low-bitrate data that you can collect on the cloud and analyse later? Im
wondering if you need to do any data processing at all? This shows how engineers
may implicitly apply certain guidelines without thinking about privacy, instead
thinking about challenges in their own expert areas.
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Some participants struggled to maintain a consistent approach across the dif-
ferent scenarios. For example, participant [E1] suggested using secure protocols
for communication with regards to Use Case 1 even before seeing our privacy
guidelines. However, they did not suggest using secure protocols for Use Cases
2 & 3. This illustrates how the PbD guidelines can support consistency in
designing privacy into IoT applications.
We noticed that using guidelines could be tricky and engineers were prone to
over analysis when applying them. For example, participant [N5] mentioned
that Distributed data processing, I did not think about this before reading the
guidelines. For scenarios two and three, we can distribute the data for process-
ing. We send them to different clouds.’ Even though distributed processing
is applicable in the scenario, attempting to employ multi-cloud processing as
a way to apply distributed processing could lead to unnecessary complexity
and higher costs with little contribution to privacy protection. This illustrates
the importance of assessing each context carefully before applying a particular
guideline.
Finally, we noted that the guideline descriptions caused some challenges
to engineers. For example, participant [E1] of Study 1 asked Whats the difference
between the reduced data granularity and the minimise data acquisition.’ We
observed similar remarks in Study 2 as well where participants mentioned that
they do not understand certain guidelines or how they can be helpful. Enhancing
the guidelines descriptions to provide an example should address these types of
issue.
6.2.3. Practical Lessons
The final theme for the lessons identified from our analysis relates to practical
aspects of integrating privacy into the design of IoT applications.
We noted that engineers in Study 1 often found it difficult to apply the
guidelines to the particular context of the use case. For example, participant
[E1] said that In this case, he needs to know which one person it is. Its important
because the personal is a person then I cant anonymise or blow it. Yes. Because
this one is really a personal thing, so I think the main problem is the cloud.
However, this is not correct. In Use Case 1, personal information can be replaced
by an identifier (for example, without using the real name. However, in this
particular instance, [E1] concluded that personal data has to be retained. In a
different example from Study 1, participant [N4] refused to apply the minimise
raw data intake guideline saying that I think it was not considered in scenario
three, where I said that we will be sending the video feed to the Cloud. That can
actually give the information regarding a particular user at that particular place.
They only realised that sending the entire video was unnecessary when prompted
by the researcher. Addressing these kinds of problems requires contextual
advice, which can be formulated as patterns and integrated into automated
design support tools.
Another lesson was the need for engineers to understand the limitations of
informed consent. We noted several examples where participants used con-
sent forms as a mechanism to justify data collection, processing and storage. For
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example, participant [E2] mentioned that Assuming that all the patients were
part of the trial that the researcher is doing, and had already signed up to allow-
ing the data to be tracked. Further, they mentioned that These were volunteers,
so, under the assumption that theyve been signed up and made fully aware that
this is going to track their movements. However, such a data collection approach
is not allowed under the new GDPR regulations [8] where all the data collection
and retention activities need to be justified. We made similar observations in
Study 2 as well. One way to address this issue is to use the PbD framework to
develop the engineers privacy mindset.
The studies also highlighted that participants understood the need for re-
sponsible engineering approaches to embed privacy into IoT application de-
sign. Indeed, many participants followed the guidelines and successfully im-
proved their designs, but also claimed that they thought about privacy consid-
erations before we showed them the guidelines, even though their designs did
not show any evidence of this. We observed two different types of responses: (1)
revisionist answers where the participant says that they have thought about a
certain guideline, but there is no evidence to support this (e.g., So, I think I did
consider the minimising the data that has been recorded [E2]); and (2) reluctant
acknowledgement that they havent thought about it (e.g., It is tricky actually
because when you are thinking about stuff you are like I kind of understand it,
but I was not really thinking that at the time. [E3]).
It is also important for engineers to consider the privacy implications of
alternative technologies when designing IoT applications. In relation to Sce-
nario 2 (Section 3.2), one participant [E4] used stationary sensors that do not
capture any personally identifiable information to collect the necessary data.
This shows how privacy risks can be reduced by selecting certain types of sens-
ing technologies provided they are appropriate for the IoT application being
developed.
Figure 9: Privacy protection measures identified in Study 2 (Round 1 - Before seeing the PbD
Guidelines)
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As shown in Figure 9, the most common privacy protection measures iden-
tified are authentication and encryption. However, in our PbD framework, we
considered these to be security measures rather than privacy protection mea-
sures. Study 2 (Round 1) also highlighted the same issue. This demonstrates
that engineers know that adequate security is important for privacy, but that
they dont necessarily understand that such security measures are not sufficient
to ensure that privacy is maintained.
6.3. Limitations
Although all the participants were able to understand our proposed guide-
lines, it was apparent that familiarity is key to applying them in a given IoT
application design in a short period of time. For our study, we printed the PbD
guidelines on plain A4 sheets as a list. However, the experience of our study
participants highlighted that this type of printed list is difficult to follow and
can be more time consuming to use. We believe that approaches such as Pri-
vacy Ideation Cards [19] and KnowCards6 would be more effective by allowing
users to quickly familiarise themselves with the guidelines. In particular, using
a colour coded, iconographic approach to represent the guidelines could help
users remember them and thus leads to faster application of guidelines with less
frustration.
An additional limitation of this work is that we did not consider the adaptive
nature of privacy. While some decisions about implementing privacy preserving
measures can be taken at design-time, IoT applications are by nature unpre-
dictable. As a result, the ability to adapt is an important feature in IoT ap-
plications. Ideally, IoT applications should be able to compose built-in privacy
preserving techniques into a run-time configuration, that maximises the privacy
protection level while maintaining the overall utility of the application.
We would like to acknowledge that our design exercise is somewhat simplified
compared to real-world industrial design. For example, most our participants
omitted the latest distributed system design strategies such as Software De-
fined Networks (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). We would
attribute this to a lack of specific knowledge on the part of our participants.
However, we do not believe this issue impacts the results as our objective was
to measure their PbD skills, not IoT infrastructure design skills.
7. Related Work
Our objective is to explore ways in which we can help software engineers
to efficiently and effectively design privacy aware IoT applications. Towards
this, in this paper, we proposed a Privacy-by-Design framework based on a
set of guidelines and an associated method for applying them. There are a
number of existing frameworks that have been proposed to help elicit privacy
6know-cards.myshopify.com
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requirements and to design privacy capabilities into systems. Privacy principles,
privacy strategies, privacy patterns have been developed to support software
engineering processes. It is important to note that none of these approaches
explicitly focus on the IoT domain or IoT application development processes.
Spiekermann [35] has identified a number of challenges in PbD approaches.
Spiekermann identified PbD as “an engineering and strategic management ap-
proach that commits to selectively and sustainably minimise information sys-
tems’ privacy risks through technical and governance controls.”. Privacy is a
vague concept without a rigid definition. Therefore, at times, it is difficult to
measure the effectiveness or efficiency of privacy protection techniques. Further,
distinguishing privacy from security is vital in order to develop methodologies to
address privacy challenges. Spiekermann [35] also highlights the problem of not
having widely agreed methodology for systematic engineering of privacy into
systems. This justifies our attempt to develop a methodology to incorporate
privacy protecting measures into IoT application designs.
Primarily, there are two approaches to incorporate privacy measures into a
system design. The first approach is threat-focussed, explicitly examines a given
system design to identify privacy threats and address them. LINDDUN [7],
which we discuss later in this section, can be considered to be an example of
a threat-focussed approach. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [38] is also an
example of this approach. The second approach is threat-agnostic, which pro-
poses applying a series of privacy protecting measures to a given design without
explicitly considering specific privacy threats. The expectation is to apply a
set of blanket measures aiming to improve the overall privacy awareness of the
design, not worrying about the threats involved. Our proposed methodology
is an example of a threat-agnostic approach. Some other examples are privacy
principles [5], and privacy strategies [13]. Both ‘Threat-focussed’ and ‘Threat-
agnostic’ approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. Due to the
unique characteristics of each approach, a hybrid approach may create better
system designs.
Threat-focussed This approach eliminates specific threats that a system might
have. Therefore, it is a mission oriented approach where it forces system
designers to think deeply about specific threats. On the down side, sys-
tems may struggle to handle threats that the designers haven’t thought
about at design time. Deep thinking processes would take more time and
complexities could lead to poor threat analysis.
Threat-agnostic This approach is somewhat simpler and less error prone due
to the absence of a threat analysis process. However, the same reason could
lead to weak privacy design caused by not handling specific threats unique
to a given system. On the other hand, this approach has more chance to
handle unexpected privacy risks at run time due to lower dependence on
threat identification processes. Therefore, highly dynamic systems may
benefit from this approach.
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Table 5: Summary of PbD Evaluation Methodologies
Area Descriptions of Evaluation the approach
Garde-Perik
[10]
This work explores the relative importance of complying with privacy
related guidelines in the context of a Health Monitoring System. A total
of 50 participants were given a text scenario describing a health care
system. This system does not adhere to any of the OECD guidelines.
Participants were then provided with potential fixes’ to the system, each
of which would make it comply with one specific OECD guideline. The
guidelines were presented in pairs where participants needed to pick which
guideline was most important.
Iachello et al.
[15]
This work had developed a mobile application to conduct user studies
in order to extract privacy guidelines. Those guidelines are then used to
develop a second mobile application to evaluate and critique the proposed
guidelines. Specific guidelines are presented later in this section.
Bellotti and
Sellen [2]
This work has proposed a design framework for privacy in ubiquitous
computing environments. They have proposed eleven criteria to evaluate
a given design as presented later in this section. They take each criteria
and evaluate it against their sample design.
LINDDUN
[7]
LINDDUN is a threat modelling technique that supports the elicitation of
privacy threats during the early stages of the software development life-
cycle. Three groups have been involved in the evaluation process (total
of 8 individuals) where they were asked to create a DFD diagram for a
given high level scenario description (two groups focused on a e-health
system and one group focused on a smart grid system) and use it to elicit
the privacy threats using the LINDDUN framework. Group discussions
were used to gather the participants’ experience. They analysed both the
results the participants documented in their reports (discovered threats),
as well as the opinions of the participants with regard to their hands-on
experience.
• Correctness: On average, how many threats uncovered by the par-
ticipants are correct (true positives vs false positives)?
• Completeness: How many threats are undetected by the partici-
pants (false negatives)?
• Productivity: How many valid threats are identified by the partic-
ipants in a given time frame?
• Ease of use: Did the participants perceive the methodology as easy
to learn and apply?
In order to explore any flaws in the LINDDUN method, the researchers
asked a panel of three privacy experts to perform an independent threat
analysis of a smart grid system using their own expertise. They have
measured the reliability by comparing the expert designs with those of
their study participants.
• Reliability: Does LINDDUN miss any important threats?
Rubinstein
and Good
[32]
Based on a review of the technical literature, this work has derived a
small number of relevant principles and illustrates them by reference to
ten recent privacy incidents involving Google and Facebook.
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Principles, Strategies, and Guidelines: The original PbD is a frame-
work proposed by Ann Cavoukian [5], the former Information and Privacy Com-
missioner of Ontario, Canada. This framework identifies seven core principles
by which privacy sensitive applications should be developed. These are: (1)
proactive not reactive; preventative not remedial, (2) privacy as the default
setting, (3) privacy embedded into design, (4) full functionality positive-sum,
not zero-sum, (5) end-to-end security-full life-cycle protection, (6) visibility and
transparency- keep it open, and (7) respect for user privacy, keep it user-centric.
Cavoukian and Jonas [6] have extended these principles by proposing seven more
specific guidelines to build PbD systems to manage big data, namely, (1) full
attribution, (2) data tethering, (3) analytics on anonymized data, (4) tamper-
resistant audit logs, (5) false negative favouring methods, (6) self-correcting
false positives and (7) information transfer accounting. The ISO 29100 Privacy
framework [16] has proposed eleven design principles, namely, (1) consent and
choice, (2) purpose legitimacy and specification, (3) collection limitation, (4)
data minimisation, (5) use, retention and disclosure limitation, (6) accuracy
and quality, (7) openness, transparency and notice, (8) individual participation
and access, (9) accountability, (10) information security, and (11) privacy com-
pliance. Wright and Raab [40] has proposed to extend these ISO guidelines
by adding 9 more guidelines, namely, (12) right to dignity, i.e., freedom from
infringements upon the person or their reputation, (13) right to be let alone (pri-
vacy of the home, etc.), (14) right to anonymity, including the right to express
one’s views anonymously, (15) right to autonomy, to freedom of thought and
action, without being surveilled, (16) right to individuality and uniqueness of
identity, (17) right to assemble or associate with others without being surveilled,
(18) right to confidentiality and secrecy of communications, (19) right to travel
(in physical or cyber space) without being tracked, and (20) people should not
have to pay in order to exercise their rights of privacy (subject to any justifiable
exceptions), nor be denied goods or services or offered them on a less preferential
basis.
The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) [4] proposed by the United
States Federal Trade Commission is also formulated as set of guidelines, namely,
(1) notice / awareness, (2) choice / consent, (3) access / participation, (4) in-
tegrity / security, and (5) enforcement / redress. Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) [39, 23] has also proposed similar pri-
vacy guidelines, namely, (1) notice, (2) purpose, (3) consent, (4) security, (5)
disclosure, (6) access, and (7) accountability. Historically, OECD guidelines
are considered as a successful milestone [39] where it laid the foundation for
both subsequent Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) [8]. Rost and Bock [31] have identified six data
protection goals, namely, (1) availability, (2) integrity, (3) confidentiality, (4)
transparency, (5) unlinkability, and (6) ability to intervene. Fisk et al. [9] have
proposed three privacy principles, namely, (1) least disclosure [internal disclo-
sure, privacy balance, inquiry-specific release], (2) qualitative evaluation [legal
constraints, technical limitations], and (3) forward progress.
Building on the ideas of engineering privacy by architecture vs. privacy-
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by-policy presented by Spiekerman and Cranor [36], Hoepman [13] proposes an
approach that identifies eight specific privacy design strategies: minimise, hide,
separate, aggregate, inform, control, enforce, and demonstrate. This is in con-
trast to other approaches that we considered. In a similar vein, Singh et al. [34]
have proposed 20 security considerations (somewhat similar to guidelines) for
IoT systems, namely, (1) secure communications, (2) access controls for IoT-
cloud, (3) identifying sensitive data, (4) cloud architectures: public, private,
or hybrid?, (5) in-cloud data protection, (6) in-cloud data sharing, (7) encryp-
tion by ‘things’, (8) data combination, (9) identifying ‘things’, (10) identifying
the provider, (11) increase in load, (12) logging at large scale, (13) malicious
’things’-protection of provider, (14) malicious ’things’-protection of others, (15)
certification of cloud service providers, (16) trustworthiness of cloud services,
(17) demonstrating compliance using audit, (18) responsibility for composite
services, (19) compliance with data location regulations, and (20) impact of
cloud decentralization on security.
Frameworks: LINDDUN [7] is a privacy threat analysis framework that
uses data flow diagrams (DFD) to identify privacy threats. LINDDUN focuses
on eliminating a set of pre-identified privacy threats using a systematic review
of data flow diagrams. It consists of six specific methodological steps: (1) define
the DFD, (2) map privacy threats to DFD elements, (3) identify threat scenarios,
(4) prioritize threats, (5) elicit mitigation strategies, and (6) select correspond-
ing privacy enhancing technologies. However, both LINDDUN and Hoepman’s
framework are not aimed at the IoT domain. Further, they not prescriptive
enough in guiding software engineers. Bellotti and Sellen [2] have proposed a
framework for design for privacy in ubiquitous computing environments. They
argue that systems must be explicitly designed to provide feedback and control
about (1) capture [when and what information collected], (2) construction [what
happens to information], (3) accessibility [which people and what software have
access to information], and (4) purposes [why data is being collected]. They also
propose eleven criteria to evaluate a given design, namely, (1) trustworthiness,
(2) appropriate timing, (3) perceptibility, (4) unobtrusiveness, (5) minimal in-
trusiveness, (6) fail-safety, (7) flexibility, (8) low effort, (9) meaningfulness, (10)
learnability, (11) low cost. In contrast, the STRIDE [14] framework was de-
veloped to help software engineers consider security threats and is an example
framework that has been successfully used to build secure software systems by
industry. It suggests six different threat categories: (1) spoofing of user iden-
tity, (2) tampering, (3) repudiation, (4) information disclosure (privacy breach
or data leak), (5) denial of service, and (6) elevation of privilege. However, its
focus is mostly on security than privacy concerns.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we explored how a Privacy-by-Design (PbD) framework can
help software engineers to design privacy-aware IoT applications. The PbD
framework comprises a set of guidelines with a method for applying them and
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we evaluated its effectiveness through an observational study where the partic-
ipants were asked to design IoT applications to satisfy three given use cases.
Our objective is to show how a set of guidelines can assist software engineers
to design better privacy aware IoT applications. According to our findings,
the proposed PbD framework significantly improved the privacy awareness of
the IoT applications designed by both novice and expert software engineers.
Further, our results show that software engineering expertise does not matter
significantly when it comes to incorporating privacy protection features into IoT
application designs. Finally, the qualitative data gathered during our studies
highlighted a range of factors affecting privacy-aware IoT application design.
These included different gaps in engineers’ knowledge and understanding of pri-
vacy; and limitations in our approach that affected engineers’ ability to apply
the PbD guidelines effectively.
In the future, we will conduct research to develop a set of privacy tactics
and patterns that are less abstract than guidelines. Such tactics and patterns
will help software engineers to tackle specific privacy design challenges in IoT
domain. At the moment, privacy guidelines are presented to the software en-
gineers in plain text organised into a list. Though it is usable, in the future,
we will explore how we can make these PbD guidelines more user friendly and
accessible to software engineers. In particular, by using human-computer inter-
action techniques, we will help software engineers to efficiently and effectively
browse and find relevant privacy guidelines, patterns and tactics in a given IoT
application design context.
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